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Introduction
Edward L. Glaeser
Agglomeration economies are the beneﬁ  ts that come when ﬁ  rms and people 
locate near one another together in cities and industrial clusters. These ben-
eﬁ  ts all ultimately come from transport costs savings: the only real diﬀerence 
between a nearby ﬁ  rm and one across the continent is that it is easier to con-
nect with a neighbor. Of course, transportation costs must be interpreted 
broadly, and they include the diﬃculties in exchanging goods, people, and 
ideas. The connection between agglomeration economies and transport 
costs would seem to suggest that agglomerations should become less impor-
tant, as transportation and communication costs have fallen. Yet, a cen-
tral paradox of our time is that in cities, industrial agglomerations remain 
remarkably vital, despite ever easier movement of goods and knowledge 
across space.
Declining transport costs have facilitated trade between China, India, and 
the rest of the world, but within those countries, development has centered 
in urban areas. Across the world, urbanization continues to increase, and the 
United Nations reports that by the end of 2008, one-  half of the world will 
live in cities.1 Indeed, megacities have become the gateways between those 
developing countries and the developed world. Within the richer nations of 
the West, many cities, like New York and London, have experienced remark-
able comebacks since the dire days of the 1970s. Wages, population, and 
especially housing prices in many dense centers have experienced robust 
growth. Indices of industrial agglomeration show only a slight decrease 
in concentration over the last thirty years (Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser 
Edward L. Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard 
University, and a research associate and director of the Urban Economics working group at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1.  http:/ / www.un.org/ esa/ population/ meetings/ EGM_PopDist/ EGM_PopDist_Report.pdf.2    Edward  L.  Glaeser
2002). If transport costs are so low, then why has the urge to agglomerate 
remained so strong?
This volume collects eleven chapters on the economics of agglomeration. 
They cover far- ranging topics, from the productivity of hospitals to the loca-
tion of fast food joints, yet they are all joined by a common goal of seeking 
to understand why economic activity clusters together. Making sense of this 
clustering is the crucial step in understanding the present and future eco-
nomics of place. All of these chapters approach agglomeration economies 
from diﬀerent angles, but taken together, the volume is meant to provide a 
sample of cutting-  edge work on the economics of agglomeration.
While the chapters in the volume are far ranging, they focus on the agglom-
eration of people within countries. Researchers such as Paul Krugman, Tony 
Venables, and Gordon Hanson have produced much knowledge about the 
links between agglomeration and international trade. Other research has 
focused on agglomeration economies within speciﬁ  c manufacturing indus-
tries in an attempt to understand why some cities specialize in speciﬁ  c sec-
tors. There is also nothing here on agglomeration economies in the devel-
oping world. While these topics are extremely important, the limited space 
available in one volume precluded their inclusion here.
Measuring Agglomeration: Prices, Wages, Quantities
Urban economists infer urban success from high local wages, robust real 
estate prices, and growth in the number of people within an area. If a place 
is doing well, then employers should be willing to pay more for workers 
in that area, people should be willing to pay more for access to that place, 
and more people should move to that area. The ﬁ  rst three chapters in the 
volume separately consider these three diﬀerent measures of local economic 
well- being.
Over the last forty- ﬁ  ve years, the spatial equilibrium has been the primary 
tool for urban and regional economists trying to make sense of cities. The 
logic of the spatial equilibrium is that since people can move freely within a 
nation, they must be indiﬀerent between diﬀerent locales. This indiﬀerence 
implies that high wages must be oﬀset by high prices or low amenities; other-
wise, people would ﬂ  ock to high- wage areas. High housing prices reﬂ  ect high 
wages, high amenities, or both.
However, the spatial equilibrium concept only gives us one-  half of the 
labor market equilibrium that determines area wages. The other half is labor 
demand—the willingness of ﬁ  rms to pay for their workers. So, while high 
wages must reﬂ  ect something bad about an area, like high prices or poor 
amenities, high wages must also reﬂ  ect something good about an area that 
makes ﬁ  rms willing to tolerate a high cost of labor. Firms wouldn’t continue 
to locate to New York City or the San Francisco Bay region unless those 
areas were productive enough to oﬀset the cost of expensive workers.
Neoclassical economics tells us that wages reﬂ  ect the marginal product Introduction    3
of labor. In a standard Cobb-  Douglas formulation of the producer’s prob-
lem, where most capital is mobile, the high marginal product of labor in a 
given area must either reﬂ  ect a high productivity level or an abundance of 
nontraded capital inputs to production. Wages, therefore, can be interpreted 
as telling us about the core determinants of urban productivity, and high 
wages in an area are usually interpreted as meaning that the area is unusu-
ally productive.
One of the facts that supports the existence of agglomeration economies 
is the strong relationship between density and high wages. This fact is mir-
rored in the strong relationship between area density and per capita gross 
metropolitan product (GMP) shown in ﬁ  gure 1. This fact is quite statistically 
robust, but the causal chain in the relationship is diﬃcult to infer. Does the 
density-  productivity relationship mean that the dense places become more 
productive or that productive places attract more people? The need to tease 
out the direction of causality in this relationship motivates the ﬁ  rst chap-
ter in this volume, on agglomeration in France, written by Pierre-  Philippe 
Combes, Gilles Duranton, Laurent Gobillon, and Sébastien Roux.
Their chapter looks at the connection between density and both wages and 
total factor productivity in France. They start by conﬁ  rming the existence 
of a strong, robust relationship between density and both wages and pro-
ductivity in France. This fact parallels the well-  known density-  productivity 
relationship in the United States (Ciccone and Hall 1996). They then con-
sider two challenges in interpreting this fact as evidence for agglomeration 
economies. One possibility is that dense places are more productive because 
they attract more skilled workers. Glaeser and Mare (2001) ﬁ  nd little evi-
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dence that this is the case in U.S. cities, but the selection of the skilled into 
cities seems to be much stronger in France. They use an individual ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects approach and ﬁ  nd that allowing for individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects reduces 
the estimated impact of density on wages by about one-  third.
Their second contribution is to use a wide range of historical and geologi-
cal instruments for current density levels. Population patterns in France are 
remarkably permanent. The density of districts in France today is highly 
correlated with density 170 years ago and with basic features of the soil. 
Their instrumental variables estimates are generally quite close to estimates 
found using ordinary least squares. As long as we believe that these instru-
ments are not independently correlated with productivity today, then this 
provides evidence for strong agglomeration economies. If readers doubt that 
this orthogonality condition holds, then their results at least provide a strik-
ing set of facts about the correlation between geology and prosperity.
Real estate prices provide a second means of assessing the success of an 
area. One sign that agglomeration has been doing well over the last twenty-
 ﬁ ve years is that housing prices have risen more dramatically in dense met-
ropolitan areas. Figure 2 shows the 0.42 percent correlation between den-
sity in 1980 and price growth between 1980 and 2006 (calculated using the 
Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight repeat sales index). The 
spatial equilibrium framework suggests that this fact can either mean that 
dense places have become more pleasant over time or that dense places have 
become more productive.
But the growth in housing prices has not been uniformly experienced 
across all metropolitan areas. Some places, like San Francisco and New 
York City, have been christened “superstar cities” by the authors of the sec-
ond chapter in this volume: Joseph Gyourko, Christopher Mayer, and Todd 
Sinai. Their chapter documents the extraordinary price growth of a small set 
of urban areas, which has continued decade by decade since 1940, and then 
tries to understand the causes for price growth in these areas.
Broadly speaking, high prices in a region can reﬂ  ect economic vitality that 
pushes up wages, consumer amenities that increase the willingness to pay 
to live in an area, or rigid housing supply. Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai argue 
that rising prices in superstar cities cannot be completely explained by rising 
productivity levels in those areas. They argue instead that these places have 
high amenities and restrictions on housing supply. Rising levels of inequality 
in the country as a whole have led the wealthiest Americans to be willing to 
pay more and more to live in high-  amenity areas of the country.
The growth of population or employment provides a third means of mea-
suring local success. If housing supply is neither perfectly elastic nor per-
fectly inelastic, then a boom in local productivity will increase both wages 
and population in an area. In places with more elastic housing, area-  level 
success should show up primarily in the form of larger population levels—
not in higher wages or higher housing prices.Introduction    5
The concentration of people and industries has long been seen by econo-
mists as evidence for the existence of agglomeration economies. After all, 
why would so many people suﬀer the inconvenience of crowding into the 
island of Manhattan if there weren’t also advantages from being close to 
so much economic activity? However, there is a debate about interpreting 
the concentration of people and ﬁ  rms, just as there is about interpreting the 
connection between density and productivity. People and ﬁ  rms might be 
clustering because of some innate advantage possessed by a particular spot 
of earth, not just because of agglomeration economies. Indeed, in the nine-
teenth century, some of Manhattan’s mass appeal may well have reﬂ  ected 
the natural advantages bestowed by its remarkable port.
Today, it is harder to believe that industrial and urban clusters reﬂ  ect 
natural advantage rather than agglomeration economies. The statistical work 
that has tried to assess the importance of natural advantage to geographic 
concentration ﬁ  nds that only about one- quarter of industrial concentration 
can be explained by observable sources of natural advantage (Ellison and 
Glaeser 1999). But all of the work measuring the clustering of population 
has tended to measure agglomerations based on political boundaries. These 
political boundaries are often drawn around existing agglomerations, and 
this creates an inherent bias in using political borders.
If political boundaries are drawn in a way that reﬂ  ects existing population 
patterns, then we might think that we observe agglomerations of activity, 
even when there is no innate tendency for clustering. Even a random dis-
Fig. 2    Population density and housing price growth6    Edward  L.  Glaeser
tribution of population across space will be lumpy. While some measures 
of industrial concentration correct for that lumpiness (Ellison and Glaeser 
1997), standard corrections for lumpiness can do little if the geographic 
units are drawn around the lumps. In many cases, the statistical properties 
of spatial areas would be far easier to understand if geographic areas were 
deﬁ  ned by a ﬁ  xed grid rather than by political boundaries.
This problem is particularly severe when thinking about the distribution 
of city sizes across space, generally described by Zipf’s law. If larger cities 
are allowed to encompass more geographic area, then the distribution of 
city sizes reﬂ  ects both density and the arbitrary boundaries that adjust to 
ﬁ  t that density. If areas below a certain size are not considered cities at all, 
then the distribution of city sizes will be truncated below a certain popu-
lation level.
The third chapter in this volume, by Thomas Holmes and Sanghoon Lee, 
presents a new take on the measurement of spatial concentration. Instead 
of using political boundaries, Holmes and Lee lay down a grid of six-  mile-
  by-  six-  mile squares. These squares then become their “cities,” geographic 
areas that are truly random. While they focus on using their grid approach 
to revisit the topic of Zipf’s law, this type of approach could be valuable in 
many other settings. For example, it would be useful to measure industrial 
concentration using their thirty-  six mile squares instead of counties or to 
look at population growth regressions using their natural geographic areas 
instead of counties or political cities.
Holmes and Lee have a number of striking ﬁ  ndings. Cities and metropoli-
tan areas follow a Zipf distribution, where there is always a greater density 
of smaller cities. However, the left tail of the distribution of squares looks 
much more bell-  shaped and normal. For example, there are about twice as 
many squares with two people than there are with one person. In low- density 
areas, the political deﬁ  nitions of units seem to be driving the received wis-
dom about the size distribution of cities.
In high-  density areas, Holmes and Lee ﬁ  nd a kink in the distribution of 
population around 50,000 people. Above that point, the number of really 
populous places falls much more radically than Zipf’s law suggests. While 
Zipf’s law suggests that the coeﬃcient between rank and population size is 
1, they ﬁ  nd a coeﬃcient of 2 among their high- density squares, which means 
that rank rises more quickly than population.
Gabaix (1999) connects Zipf’s law with Gibrat’s law. He ﬁ  nds that if places 
grow proportionally, then the distribution of place populations should fol-
low Zipf’s law. Since Holmes and Lee ﬁ  nd that their squares do not follow 
Zipf’s law, we shouldn’t be surprised that they also ﬁ  nd that Gibrat’s law 
fails for their thirty-  six mile squares. They ﬁ  nd that growth rates are much 
lower among places that start with more people, which perhaps explains the 
absence of ultra- high population areas. Their results can be taken to suggest 
that some form of congestion sets in at ultra-  high densities.Introduction    7
The Sources of Agglomeration: The Costs of Moving People
Understanding agglomeration economies requires us to move beyond 
measuring the overall extent of agglomeration as revealed by housing prices, 
productivity, and population concentration. We must also understand the 
exact mechanisms that make it more productive to cluster. While all agglom-
eration economies can be understood as consequences of reduced trans-
port costs, the nature of the agglomeration economy will depend on what 
transport costs are being reduced. For example, the classic Krugman (1991) 
model of agglomeration emphasized agglomeration beneﬁ  ts that come from 
reducing the costs of moving goods over space. When an input supplier 
locates next to a ﬁ  nal goods producer, these ﬁ  rms become more productive 
by saving the costs of shipping the input.
None of the chapters in this volume focus on agglomeration economies 
that come from reducing the costs of moving goods over space, perhaps 
because researchers have reached a consensus that such agglomeration 
economies are now relatively second order. A century or more ago, when 
shipping goods was expensive, cities like Chicago and New York formed 
around ports and rail yards. Over the twentieth century, the cost of moving 
goods declined enormously, and few modern agglomerations seem built on 
the easy movement of physical output. Today, the bulk of urban growth, 
at least in the United States, appears to be in far-  ﬂ  ung places that seem to 
have little advantage in the shipment of goods. There is some evidence that 
manufacturing ﬁ  rms still cluster near suppliers and customers, but even this 
clustering seems relatively weak (Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser 2002).
While the costs of moving goods may have declined dramatically, the cost 
of moving people is still high. After all, time is a major input into human 
travel, and the value of time continues to rise as people become more produc-
tive. Even if changes in transportation technology make it possible to locate 
goods production anywhere in the world, there will still be an advantage 
from clusters that minimize the costs of moving people across space. This 
volume has three chapters that look at diﬀerent types of agglomeration 
economies that come from reducing the costs of moving people.
Chapter 4 by Henry Overman and Diego Puga examines labor market 
pooling—an idea whose pedigree stretches back to Alfred Marshall. The 
basic concept is that if there are many employers within an area, then work-
ers can change employers without changing residences. Job hopping creates 
advantages if workers don’t know where they will be most productive or if 
the productivity of diﬀerent ﬁ  rms changes over time. Labor market pooling 
allows labor to be more eﬃciently allocated following productivity shocks, 
because workers can leave ﬁ  rms that have become less productive and move 
to employers that have become relatively more productive.
Krugman (1991) provided a simple and elegant model of labor market 
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extends the Krugman model to multiple sectors and multiple locations. This 
extension is important because it generates predictions about which types 
of ﬁ  rms will colocate with one another and what types of colocation will 
generate the biggest beneﬁ  ts. A key result is that the agglomeration beneﬁ  ts 
are biggest when the sectors have shocks that are heterogeneous so that their 
shocks are particularly uncorrelated. This result, of course, requires that the 
sectors are still similar enough so that workers can move across them.
To test this implication empirically, Overman and Puga look across sec-
tors within the United Kingdom. They calculate a measure of the beneﬁ  ts 
of labor market pooling by estimating the extent to which diﬀerent plants 
within a sector seem to have idiosyncratic employment shocks. Presumably, 
workers can always move across plants within an industrial sector, and sec-
tors with more plant-  level employment variation would seem to be sectors 
with more shocks to plant-  level productivity. They ﬁ  nd that sectors with 
more plant- level employment shocks are more geographically concentrated. 
While one can reasonably worry whether greater geographic concentration 
within a sector is partially responsible for greater plant-  level variation in 
employment, that reverse causality should also be seen as a prediction of 
a labor market pooling model. This chapter is one of the few papers that 
attempt to test this important, century-  old idea.
The next two chapters examine a simpler agglomeration mechanism 
that still stems from the beneﬁ  ts that come from reducing transport costs 
for people. Service industries can almost be deﬁ  ned as sectors that require 
person-  to-  person delivery. While this statement may be too strong, there is 
no doubt that services involve a lot more face-  to-  face contact than manu-
facturing. As a result, when service industries cluster near customers, they 
reduce the travel costs, either for their customers or for their workers. The 
continuing importance of transport costs for people may explain why ser-
vices have remained urbanized, even as manufacturing has ﬂ  ed to lower-
 density  settings.
Chapter 5 by Jed Kolko provides a sweeping view of agglomeration and 
urbanization in the service sector. Services are less agglomerated but more 
urbanized than manufacturing. City streets are a good setting for services, 
because they enable service providers to readily link with large numbers of 
their diverse customers. The higher transport costs involved in face-  to-  face 
delivery tie services to dense urban areas. Across services, Kolko ﬁ  nds a 
positive relationship between urbanization and concentration. The services 
that are most likely to beneﬁ  t from connections to diverse urban populations 
are also most likely to concentrate. Perhaps these are the sectors with the 
highest transport costs.
Across service industries, human capital strongly predicts urbanization. 
As chapter 10 by Glaeser and Ponzetto emphasizes, cities seem to be par-
ticularly important for the transmission of ideas. Selling services directly to 
consumers also predicts location in big cities, while intensive use of natural Introduction    9
resources is negatively associated with urbanization. The use of specialized 
occupations is positively associated with both urbanization and agglomera-
tion, perhaps because the beneﬁ  ts of labor market pooling are higher for 
such specialized workers who cannot readily just take up another task.
Kolko also studies coagglomeration—the tendency of industries to colo-
cate with other industries. He ﬁ  nds a strong tendency of service industries 
to locate near their suppliers and customers. This result contrasts with the 
much weaker links between customers and suppliers found in manufacturing 
(Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser 2002). Since the costs of delivering services 
are much higher than the costs of delivering goods, it is reassuring that loca-
tion patterns seem aimed at reducing those costs.
Chapter 6 by Waldfogel continues the examination of the impact of trans-
port costs, but it focuses on retail establishments. Since these establishments 
require visits by customers, we would expect them to be located near those 
customers. Waldfogel ﬁ  nds a strong pattern where retail establishment sec-
tors locate near demographic groups that regularly buy from that sector. 
Stores catering to the well educated locate near the well educated. While the 
basic eﬀect may be unsurprising, the measured magnitude of the tendency 
to locate near likely buyers is remarkably strong.
Waldfogel then suggests that the locational tendency of retail shops pro-
vides an added beneﬁ  t to demographic clustering. If a family is more likely to 
have access to stores that meet its needs if it locates near similar families, then 
this provides a good reason for neighborhood homogeneity. This mechanism 
is a consumption-  related agglomeration eﬀect, where locating near similar 
people increases one’s ability to shop eﬃciently.
The Sources of Agglomeration: Knowledge Spillovers
Many recent papers on agglomeration economies have followed Mar-
shall and Jane Jacobs and have emphasized the role that cities can play in 
speeding the ﬂ  ow of ideas. The core idea at the center of information- based 
agglomeration economies is that all of our knowledge builds on things that 
we learn from people around us. The central premise is that the presence 
of knowledgeable neighbors enables an apprentice steelworker to learn his 
craft, but it also makes a biotechnology researcher more innovative. The 
interaction of smart people in urban areas both enhances the development 
of person-  speciﬁ  c human capital and increases the rate at which new ideas 
are formed.
In chapter 7, Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra look at the dif-
fusion of high-  quality health care in hospitals. They argue that there are a 
number of low-  cost procedures that signiﬁ  cantly improve health outcomes 
and that those procedures should be used universally. When hospitals fail to 
use these procedures, Baicker and Chandra argue that the hospital is being 
less productive. One signiﬁ  cant contribution of this chapter is to show the 10    Edward  L.  Glaeser
diversity in this productivity measure across space. In many cases, the hos-
pitals that have high quality, using their metric, are not the same hospitals 
that spend more per patient.
Baicker and Chandra illustrate the remarkable heterogeneity across met-
ropolitan areas in hospital productivity, which seems comparable to the 
diversity in productivity overall. However, in the case of Baicker and Chan-
dra’s measures, higher productivity doesn’t require any more physical capital 
but just enough human capital to use these low- cost, high- value procedures. 
They ﬁ  nd that areas with more nongovernment doctors and a higher overall 
skill base are more likely to deliver higher-  quality health care, which again 
supports the view that local human capital matters for productivity.
They also speciﬁ  cally test a learning model by regressing the quality of 
a hospital on the lagged quality of that hospital’s geographic neighbors 
and the hospital’s own lagged quality level. Hospitals that are surrounded 
by higher-  quality hospitals tend to improve in quality. One interpretation 
of these results is that doctors in one hospital learn how to practice better 
medicine by interacting with doctors in nearby hospitals. If this is the case, 
then the ﬂ  ow of ideas across people in metropolitan areas is actually saving 
lives.
Chapter 8 by William Kerr looks at intellectual connections among inven-
tors. His chapter shows that American patents are increasingly being given 
to inventors with non-  European last names. Patents are also increasingly 
geographically concentrated. Kerr connects these two facts and shows that 
the increasing geographic concentration of inventive activity is associated 
with the tendency of ethnic inventors to cluster in a few metropolitan areas. 
This clustering of ethnic inventors can explain a signiﬁ  cant amount of the 
increased clustering of patents.
Why do ethnic inventors cluster in a small number of geographic areas? 
One possibility is that these inventors are intellectually linked, and geo-
graphic proximity allows those links to ﬂ  ourish. An alternative explana-
tion is that diﬀerent immigrant groups cluster in diﬀerent cities to enjoy 
consumption-  related advantages, such as access to religious organizations 
or relevant consumer goods, or just to friends with a similar background. 
Hopefully, future work will sort out the diﬀerent explanations of the remark-
able concentration of ethnic inventors.
Chapter 9 by Stuart Rosenthal and William Strange oﬀers a third ap-
proach to invention and entrepreneurship in urban areas. Almost ﬁ  fty years 
ago, Ben Chinitz (1961) argued that one of the reasons why New York was 
more dynamic than Pittsburgh was that New York had abundant small enter-
prises, while Pittsburgh was concentrated in a few large businesses. Abundant 
small enterprises facilitated a culture of entrepreneurship, because those 
smaller ﬁ  rms needed independent input providers who could also provide 
inputs for other start-  ups. Likewise, more small ﬁ  rms might mean more in-
dependent customers, and these could provide a ready market for start- ups. Introduction    1 1
If small ﬁ  rms are less able to protect their ideas, then new innovations might 
spread more easily in places with lots of little employers.
Rosenthal and Strange ﬁ  nd that the amount of new establishment forma-
tion in an area is tightly linked to the number of small ﬁ  rms. Employment 
in big ﬁ  rms doesn’t predict these start- ups. Employment in small ﬁ  rms does. 
Their research is done at the census tract level, so they are looking at very 
small geographic areas, and within these areas, there seems to be a strong 
tendency of new ﬁ  rms to locate where there are already many small estab-
lishments.
The penultimate chapter in the volume is more of a theoretical chapter 
on the interaction between intellectual spillovers and communication and 
transportation costs. I began this introduction with the seeming paradox 
that many cities are more vital than ever, despite the fact that declining 
transportation and communication costs would seem to be making proxim-
ity obsolete. Chapter 10 by Edward Glaeser and Giacomo Ponzetto tries to 
make sense of those two facts.
The model assumes that there are three sectors in the economy: an inno-
vative sector that produces new ideas, a manufacturing sector that makes 
goods, and a sector that directly uses natural resources (like farming). All 
three sectors receive advantages from urban areas, and all three sectors use 
land. The sectors are ordered so that the innovative sector receives the big-
gest beneﬁ  ts from urban location because of idea spillovers, and the natural 
resource sector gets the least out of being in a city. The natural resource 
sector, however, uses the most land, and the innovative sector needs the 
least. This ordering means that the innovative sector is always urbanized, 
and under some conditions, it is the manufacturing sector that will be on the 
margin between urban and nonurban locations.
The authors model an increase in communication and transportation 
costs as improving the productivity in the nonurban area, relative to the 
city, in all three sectors. This has the eﬀect of moving the manufacturing 
sector out of the city and also of making the manufacturing sector more 
productive. As manufacturing becomes more productive, the returns to ideas 
increases, and this increases the size of the innovative sector in the city. In one 
version of the model, improvements in transportation and communication 
costs cause the decline of cities that specialize in manufacturing, like Detroit, 
and the rise of cities that specialize in innovation, like New York.
This model does appear to ﬁ  t some of the recent facts about urban change. 
In the 1960s, almost all cities specialized in manufacturing. The ability to 
produce goods more cheaply outside of cities caused almost all of those 
places to do poorly in the 1970s. However, since then, cities with abundant 
human capital that specialized in innovation have done exceedingly well. 
In many cases, these places are coming up with new ideas that will then be 
produced in low- cost areas throughout the world. This chapter suggests that 
globalization seems likely to be good for cities that continue to specialize 12    Edward  L.  Glaeser
in the production of innovation, but it will continue to mean decline for 
manufacturing areas.
A Congestion Cost: Pollution and Cities
Density is not without its costs. Not only is land more expensive in urban 
areas, but congestion, pollution, and social problems often accompany the 
crowding of people into cities. The last chapter in this volume, by Matthew 
Kahn, reviews these costs of urban density and their trends over time.
Kahn presents an intensive look at commute times by distance to the city 
center. He distinguishes between big and small metropolitan areas, and he 
compares the years 1980 and 2000. In most metropolitan areas, commute 
times rise monotonically with distance to the city center, but in the largest 
metropolitan areas (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago), there is a nonmono-
tonic relationship between distance to the city center and commute times. In 
those largest areas, people who are far from the city center aren’t commuting 
downtown at all. In all areas at all distances from the city center, commute 
times have been rising. Higher levels of congestion mean that the speed of 
travel has slowed signiﬁ  cantly. Those speeds are slowest in big metropolitan 
areas, and this congestion is one of the big costs of living in a large metro-
politan area.
While commuting costs are rising, the pollution problems of big cities 
appear to have been falling over the last twenty-  ﬁ  ve years. Kahn links this 
decline to the exodus of manufacturing from big cities, but cleaner big-  city 
air also reﬂ  ects the rise of catalytic converters and the lower levels of car 
emissions. Crime rates have also been falling in big cities over the past twelve 
years. While big cities bore the brunt of the national crime increase between 
1960 and 1975, big cities have also seen the biggest drops in crime rates since 
their peak in the early 1990s. One possible explanation for this phenomenon 
is that big cities, like New York, have experienced the greatest improvements 
in policing quality.
Overall, Kahn’s chapter suggests a mixed picture. Congestion is getting 
worse, but pollution and crime are getting better. One possible interpreta-
tion of these facts is that new technologies, whether used by automobile 
manufacturers or police departments, have been more eﬀective in ﬁ  ghting 
pollution and crime than in reducing congestion.
Agglomeration Economies and Public Policy
None of the chapters oﬀer any speciﬁ  c public policy proposals, but re-
search on agglomeration economies should be of interest to both local and 
national policymakers. For example, if concentrations of skilled workers 
increase local productivity or growth, then attracting or educating more 
skilled workers may appeal to local politicians interested in boosting incomes Introduction    1 3
or city populations. If agglomeration economies mean that cities become 
wealthier once they reach a certain scale, then city planners might want to 
permit enough housing to expand to that scale.
The existence of agglomeration economies can imply diﬀerent things for 
local and national policymakers. For example, if moving skilled people from 
New York to Detroit makes Detroit richer, then it is easy to imagine that 
Detroit policymakers would ﬁ  nd policies that achieved that goal attractive. 
It is, however, harder to imagine that national policymakers, or policymak-
ers representing New York, would see an advantage in redistributing talent 
between these two cities.
In general, the existence of agglomeration economies does not itself give 
guidance about optimal regional policy. For example, advocates of London’s 
Crossrail system emphasized that increasing commuter access to the city 
would bring in more workers who might generate agglomeration econo-
mies. However, those workers would presumably be coming from somewhere 
else. Any gains to London might be oﬀset by reductions in agglomeration 
economies elsewhere. The existence of agglomeration economies does not 
itself suggest moving people from less-  dense to   denser areas, because as 
long as people remain in the less-  dense areas, their productivity will fall 
with the move.
Questions of regional policy often require more than just a general sense 
that agglomeration economies exist. Instead, policymakers would presum-
ably be interested in whether agglomeration economies are stronger in some 
areas than others. In particular, the agglomeration economy case for poli-
cies like Crossrail that enhance larger cities often rests on the existence of 
nonlinearities, such that agglomeration economies get stronger as cities grow. 
Despite the century or so of research on agglomeration economies, we are 
still far from having reliable estimates of such nonlinearities.
Directions for Future Research
The measurement of such nonlinearities is only one of the pressing top-
ics for future research in this area. The chapters in this volume point to two 
major lines of research. One area, suggested by the Combes, Duranton, 
Gobillon, and Roux chapter, is to focus on providing better estimates of 
overall agglomeration eﬀects. After all, these overall eﬀects are a necessary 
parameter in many policy puzzles. However, estimating these eﬀects will 
requires solving a thorny identiﬁ  cation problem.
The basic problem with estimating agglomeration eﬀects on productiv-
ity is that population density is not itself exogenous. People move to places 
that are more productive. To solve this problem, researchers need sources 
of variation that are unrelated to productivity. Some amenities or quirks of 
housing supply might provide tools for estimating the impact of increasing 
population on productivity. Historical population levels are somewhat more 14    Edward  L.  Glaeser
diﬃcult to use, because they are correlated both with historic productivity 
and with productivity-  enhancing investments made over time.
The second line of research on agglomeration economies is to focus on 
particular industries or elements in overall agglomeration eﬀects. In this 
volume, the chapters by Baicker and Chandra, Kahn, and Kolko all illustrate 
this approach. The disadvantage with this approach is that it will not tell us 
about overall agglomeration eﬀects, and overall eﬀects may be an important 
component of policy discussion. The advantage is that these more focused 
studies allow for better identiﬁ  cation. As usual, there is a trade-  oﬀ between 
the size of the question and the precision of the answer.
More focused studies oﬀer more precision, because it is possible to believe 
that the outcome variables do not directly determine the level of popula-
tion or employment concentration. For example, productivity certainly at-
tracts population, which makes it hard to use the cross- sectional relationship 
between density and productivity to assess agglomeration eﬀects. More spe-
ciﬁ  c outcomes, like local traﬃc congestion, are less likely to drive population 
patterns, and as a result, the identiﬁ  cation problems are less diﬃcult.
This volume is meant to give a sample of the exciting work that is being 
done to understand the mysteries of agglomeration. Big cities are more 
productive for many reasons, but they also have their costs. Indeed, if they 
didn’t, then everyone would live in one. These chapters are by no means the 
last word on agglomeration economies, but they do illustrate the wide range 
of exciting work that is being done by economists in this area.
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